The recent Israeli elections mark a turning point in Israeli political history bringing into power Ehud Barak. His main platform is to refocus and reenergize the peace process. Interestingly, his election was not a mandate for his policy as much as it was a repudiation of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu.

While Barak has clearly stated that he favors a more open Israeli society and a clearer division between religion and the state, he has said that his main effort will be to concentrate on achieving peace with Israel’s Arab neighbors. Focusing on change in Israeli society will have to wait until peace is accomplished. This is reflected in the composition of his cabinet that includes two important religious parties and secular parties that include those on the right as well as the left. Excluded from his cabinet is the Likkud party, whose leaders are not prepared for the tough compromises necessary to conclude the peace process.

In diplomatic negotiations each side must know the absolute bottom line that brought each party to the negotiating table. The bottom line for the Palestinians is achieving their own sovereign state; for the Syrians, it is the return of the Golan Heights to their control; for the Lebanese, it is the return and control of the pre Israeli invasion borders. For Israel, the bottom line is the security of their land and defensibility of their borders as well as control over an undivided Jerusalem.

Also, in diplomatic negotiations the definition of absolutes is often negotiable as tertiary issues that impact the bottom line are thrown into the mix. One such issue is the legal and residency status of Jewish settlers on the West Bank and the Golan Heights and of Arabs in Israel, particularly those living in Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees living in other countries. From this, other issues will arise to include the political status of Jewish settlements, the sovereignty of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the borders between Lebanon and Israel and the new Palestinian state and Israel. It seems likely that Israel will relinquish total control of the Golan Heights but will demand either its complete demilitarization and/or a buffer zone controlled by either the U.S. or the United Nations. Some Jewish settlements on the West Bank will probably remain as Jewish enclaves, particularly those which have military-strategic significance. A Jewish presence in Hebron will probably be eliminated, but there will be access to the Cave of Machpelah. Since Israel cannot give up rule over Jerusalem, the Palestinians will demand to have control over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and that the Israeli Arab population will be able to choose Palestinian citizenship but remain under the sovereign territorial control of Israel.

The questions of Israel’s security and the Palestinian state’s viability are tied to the disposition of Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian state needs the skilled talents of the highly educated Palestinians in Lebanon, Jordan, the Persian Gulf States, Europe, and North America. But it would be very problematical to absorb impoverished and unskilled Palestinians living in refugee camps throughout the middle east. Their remaining in camps (the loss of political leverage these refugees brought for the Arab host countries will probably result in those governments pushing for their emigration) would negate the legitimacy of the new Palestinian state as a homeland for the Palestinian people. If absorbed into the new Palestinian state, they will be rife with discontent stemming from their impoverished condition resulting in an economic drain that could threaten the Palestinian government. Yet left in those camps, the refugees would pose a threat to the security of Israel because they would continue to be a breeding place for terrorists.

Israel will demand that the Arab countries have specific plans possibly coordinated with Israeli security services for making concerted efforts to prevent the existence of any organized terrorist groups operating within their territory. This will force many of these groups to go underground as its members have known no other way of life but that tied to the cause of fighting Israel. For many, that has become their raison d'être.

There must be some formal economic tie between the Arab states and Israel to guarantee the continued pacific relationship. The scarce but vital water resources must be shared and managed in an equitable way. Israel’s technological and industrial skills along with its capital must help economic development and growth in the new Palestinian state and in the other Arab states to ensure their political stability. Israel’s agronomic and agricultural expertise will help increase productivity of Arab lands. There will eventually be free and open markets and joint ventures in such things as building the Palestinian state’s infrastructure and startup industrial ventures, and in the provision of regional health care. If Arab societies do not make significant progress educationally, socially, and economically, then Muslim fundamentalism will increasingly threaten their political stability. And that would threaten the stability of the whole region, including Israel. Perhaps the most difficult problem confronting the Arab governments is to soften the seemingly intractable hostile mindset of its population towards Israel. This is also not an insignificant problem for an Israeli government whose population has experienced the trauma of a significant percentage of its population killed or maimed during 51 years of hostility. To counter this, it is my judgment that in order to maintain a permanent peace, rather than embracing the notion of gradualism entailing a rather strict separation of Arabs and Israelis, there must be and embracing of strong economic and cultural ties soon after a final accord is reached.

Finally, agreement must be reached on the thorny question of economic compensation for Palestinians who left Israel during the 1948 War of Independence and Jews who fled from Arab lands. This issue, I believe, has more symbolic rather than material significance because of the seemingly impossible restraints that the passage of time and present circumstances present. Resolution must be linked to providing a practical closure to past grievances, thus allowing all parties to focus on future bridge building aimed at securing regional growth and development. It is this goal that will allow Israel and its Arab neighbors to continue to work toward making any final settlement permanent and may very well lead to a future regional security alliance. Greater improbabilities have become reality in world politics.